




The different Modes in which it may be dissoTved.
A partnership is dissolved in the following ways :'
1. The expiration of the time for which it has been contracted.
2. The extinction of the thing or the completion of the business
which constituted the object of the partnership. 3. The death,
natural or civil, of one of the partners; his insolvency. 4. The
wish of being no longer in the partnership.
1 .anslated from the Treatise of Pothier, 3 O'Euv. de Poth., p. 530, ed. 1825.
2 According to our law a partnership for a limited time terminates" at the ex-
piration of that time The question, however, arises, when parties carry on the
partnership business after the expiration of the time for which it was contracted,
upon what terms is it to be considered as carried on ? It has been decided that a
presumption arises, in the absence of all acts and circumstances to vary and
control it, that it is intended to be a new partnership upon the same terms as the
original partnership, but for an indefinite period, and therefore determinable im-
mediately at the will of any of the partners, although under the original partnership
contract, notice of a dissolution was requisite; and the mere fact of there being
unexpired leases of the premises, or contracts subsisting with workmen or others,
is no sufficient ground for any presumption that the new partnership is intended to
last either until the expiration of the leases or the completion of the contracts.
Featherstonhaugh vs. Fenwich, Yes. 299, 307. Story on Partn. 267, 4th ed.
VoL. VIL-9.
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§ I. As to the -Expiration of the Time.
When the partnership has been contracted for a certain limited
time, it terminates (de plein droit) at once by the expiration of that
time.'
The parties may agree to prolong it beyond that time; but that
prolongation by the French law can only be proved by a written
deed, which the Ordonnance of 1673 subjects to the same for-
malities as the deed by which the partnership was contracted.
§ IL The Extinction of the Thing which constitutes the Oiject
of the Partnership, and of the Completion of the Business.
When a partnership has been contracted in a certain thing, it is
evident that it must end by the extinction of such thing.
For example, if two peasants buy in common an ass to carry
their goods to market for sale, it is clear that, if the ass dies, their
partnership in that ass will be at an end. _eque enim ejus rei quce
jim nulla sit, quisquam socius est; 1. 63. § 10. if. Pro ,Soe.
Dig. lib. xvii. tit. 2. 1. 63. § 10.
When partners have contracted a partnership, not in things
themselves, but in the fruits arising from certain things belonging
to one of them, in order that they may receive them in common,
and make thereof a common profit during the continuance of the
partnership; if such things perish, the partnership will be at an
end; for, it being essential to the partnership, that each of the
partners should contribute thereto, it can no longer exist when one
of them has no longer anything wherewith to contribute thereto.
For example, when two neighbors, who have each a cow, con-
tract a partnership of all the produce and profits which should arise
from them during a certain time ; if, before its expiration, the cow
of one of the partners dies, the partnership will terminate, because
that partner has no longer any thing to contribute thereto.
When two persons have contracted a partnership to sell in com-
mon, certain things belonging to them, and they have not put the
things themselves into the partnership, but the produce to arise
I Consult Story Partn. 268, 269, 270, 4th ed.
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from the sale ; if, before the sale, the things belonging to one of
the partners perish, the law decides that the partnership is ex-
tinguished. The reason is, that such partner, having no longer
any thing to contribute thereto, it cannot exist.1
I The conclusion that Pothier has arrived at, that a party who has contracted to
contribute his personal skill to a partnership, gives a just ground for its dissolution
when he is unable, in consequence of illness, as paralysis, to fulfill his engagement,
seems to be correct, and to be analogous in principle to the relief which a court of
equity gives by terminating a partnership when one of the partners becomes in-
curably insane, although, in the latter case, there is an additional reason why a
dissolution should take place. Lord Kenyon has well observed, "when there are
two partners, both of whom are to contribute their skill and industry in carrying
on the trade, the insanity of one of them, by which he is rendered incapable to
contribute that skill and industry on his part, is a good ground to put an end to
the partnership, not by the authority of either of the partners, but by application
to a court of justice, and this for the sake of the partner who is rendered in-
capable, as well as of the other; for it would be a great hardship upon a person so
disordered, if his property might be continued in a business which he could not
control or inspect, and be subject to the imprudence of another." Sayer vs. Bennet,
Mont. Part. vol. i. Appendix, p. 18. 1 Cox, 107.
"If the partnership proceed in reliance on such aid from a partner as any bodily
illness he may be affected with may prevent, it would seem to be ajustifiable cause
for having the partnership judicially dissolved, or for renouncing the partnership,
although there should be a fixed term of duration not yet arrived. Insanity has
the effect, not only of depriving the partner of the power of aiding the partnership
by his exertion, but it prevents him from controlling for his own safety, the pro-
ceedings of his copartners ; and, accordingly, where there are two partners, both
of whom are to contribute their skill and industry, the insanity of one of them,
by which he is rendered incapable of contributing that skill and industry, seems to
be a good ground to put an end to the partnership. At the same time, it may be
observed that these are cases of infinite delicacy. There is no line of distinction
by which it shall be ascertained how long a term of inability shall justify mea-
sures of this description. A broken leg, or an accidental blow, may incapacitate
a partner for a time, as much as insanity, and the one may be as temporary as the
other; and, perhaps, the nearest approximation to be made to a rule on the sub-
ject is, that a remedy and relief will be given only where the circumstances amount
to a total and important failure in those essential points on which the success of
the partnership depends. Cases may be supposed of danger so imminent, from bad
health, lunacy, habits of intoxication, etc., as to make the continuance of the part-
nership likely to prove ruinous to all concerned; as in the case of uncontrollable
habits of intoxication in the partner of a gunpowder manufactory. In cases of this
description, there can be no doubt that such perils will afford ground for judicial
interference to dissolve the company. But it may be doubted whether they would
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Suppose a timber merchant has entered into partnership with a
cooper to make and sell casks, to which partnership the merchant
is to bring the wood, and the cooper his labor only in making the
casks. The cooper having afterwards become paralytic, and con-
not justify the other partners in entering the act of dissolution in the books, to be
followed up as soon as possible by judicial measures; for such a state of things
may occur at the commencement of a long vacation, when no proper opportunity
can be had of dissolving by judicial interposition." 2 Bell's Comm. b. 7, oh. 2,
p. 634, 635, 5th ed.
So when a war breaks out between two different States, it will dissolve a partner-
ship entered into between the subjects of those States. Griswold vs. Waddington, 16
Johns. 438, 490. Mr. Chancellor Kent, in his learned and able judgment, says,
'-The principle here is, that when one of the parties becomes disabled to act, or
when the business of the association becomes impracticable, the law, as well as
common reason, adjudges the partnership to be dissolved. Pothier, in his Treatise
on Partnership, says, that every partnership is dissolved by the extiDction of the
business forwhich it was formed. This he illustrates in his usual manner, byanum-
ber of easy and familiar examples. Thus, if a partnership be formed between two
or more persons, for bringing together and selling on joint account the produce of
their farms, or of their live stock, and the produce or the stock of one of them should
happen to fail, or be destroyed, the partnership ceases of course, for there can be
no longer any partnership when one has nothing to contribute. So if two persons
form a partnership in a particular business, and the one engages to furnish capital,
or the raw materials, and the other his skill and labor, and the latter becomes dis-
abled by palsy, the partnership is extinguished, because the object of the partner-
ship cannot be fulfilled. So, again, if two or more persons form a partnership to
buy and sell goods at a particular place, the partnership is dissolved whenever the
business is terminated. .Extincto mubjecto, tollitur adjunctum, is the observation of
Huberus, 'when speakingon this very point.
We can easily perceive with what force their doctrines apply to this case, for a
partnership, formed between alien friends, must at once be defeated, when they
become alicn enemies. They can no more assist each other than if they were
palsied in their limbs, or bereft of their understandifigs by the visitation of Provi-
dence. I have selected these principles of partnership from the treatise of Pothier
because his reputation and great authority are known in this country. He has
treated of the law of partnership, as he has of other civil contracts, with a clear-
ness of perception, a precision of style, and a fullness of illustration, above all
praise, beyond all example. If it should be asked, why is Pothier silent, like the
English law, concerning the effect of war on a partnership between the subjects of
two belligerent states ? the answer may be given, that the possibility of such a
question never could have occurred to a French lawyer, since it has been the law of
France, for ages, that all intercourse, communication, and commerce between the
subjects of France and her enemies, was prohibited upon pain of death."
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sequently incapable of making casks, will the partnership in that
case cease, and can it be said that the cooper has no longer any
thing to contribute thereto ? No ! because by undertaking by the
contract to make casks, he undertook to make them not himself
only, but either himself or by his workmen; he can, therefore,
although paralytic, cause them to be made by his workmen; and he
has it in his power, consequently, to contribute to the partnership
what he has agreed.
Suppose, however, the merchant, who entered into the partnership
solely from the confidence which he had in the skill of that
workman, had inserted a clause in the partnership contract that the
cooper should not cause any casks to be made by any persons
except himself ? In that case it may be said that the partnership
is extinct, since that which such partner agreed to contribute
thereto is extinct; being not only the mere manufacture of the
casks, but also his personal labor, which he has agreed to contribute
to the partnership, and which he can no longer contribute thereto.
The merchant, nevertheless, would act prudently in giving him
notice of a renunciation of the partnership.
When two or more persons enter into partnership for a certain
business, that partnership will terminate when the business has been
completed- For example, when two merchants have contracted a
partnership to buy together a certain parcel of goods to sell at the
fair of Guibray, it is clear that such partnership will terminate
when they have sold all there.1
§ III. As to the Death of one of the Partners, and is Insolvency.
The partnership, whether it be universal, particular, indefinite,
or for a certain limited time, is dissolved at once by the death of
one of the partners.
2
I Consult Story Partn., 317, 4th ed.
2 So, according to our law, a partnership, although it may be entered into for a
definite period, will be dissolved before its expiration, by the death of one of the
partners, unless there be an express stipulation to the contrary. Gillespie vs.
Hamilton, 3 Madd. 254; Crawshay vs. Maule, 1 Swanst. 495, 509. One effect of
PARTNERSHIP.
This dissolution of the community, which takes place by the
death of one of the partners, has two effects. The first is, that the
heir succeeds to the share which the deceased had at the time of
his death in the partnership property, and to the share of the debts
of the partnership by which the deceased was bound; but he does
not succeed to the future rights of the partnership, save only to
such as are necessary consequences of what has been done during
the life of the partner to whom he succeeds; and even with regard
to these he does not become a partner of the partner deceased,
for he does not take his place, he is only in community with
them.
According to these principles, if, after the death of one of the
partners, the survivor has made some new advantageous bargain
having relation to the commerce for which the partnership was
contracted, the heir of the deceased partner can have no claim to
any share of it; and if the bargain was disadvantageous, he cannot
be compelled to bear any part of the loss.
The Roman jurisconsults have carried this principle so far, as to
decide, that a person could not even when contracting a partnership
enter into a valid agreement that the heir of such of the partners
who happened to die during the continuance of the partnership
should become a partner in the place of the deceased: adeo morte
soeii solvitur societas, ut nec ab initio pacisci possimus, "1 ut lceres
etiam succedat soietati;" 1. 59. ff. Pro. Soc. Dig. lib. xvii. tit.
2.1. 59.1
The reason of this decision was, that the partnership being a right
which is founded upon the friendship of the parties for each other,
and upon the reciprocal confidence which each has in the fidelity
the dissolution of the partnership by the death of one of the partners is, that his
representatives, although entitled to his share, do not succeed him in the partner-
ship. See Collyer Partn., 5, 6, 118. Story on Partn. 271, 4th ed.
I Our law, according to the doctrine contended for by Pothier, in opposition to the
Roman law, lays no restraint on the period of partnership, or the description of
persons to -whom, on the death of the original partners, the benefit of the contract
is reserved. 1 Swanst. 510. n.; Stuart v. Earl of Bute, 3 Ves. 212; Balmain v.
Shore, 9 Yes. 500; Warner v. Cunningham, 3 Dow. 76; Coil. Partn. 5, 6; Story
Partn. 6.
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and good qualities of the other; it is contrary to its nature that it
could be contracted with an uncertain and an unknown person, and
consequently with the heirs of the contracting parties, who at the
time of the contract were uncertain, the partner not being able
even to engage himself to adopt a certain person as his heir; 1. 65.
§ 9. ff. Diet. Tit. Dig. lib. xvii. tit. 2. 1. 65. § 9.
This reason does not appear to me to be very conclusive, and I
believe there is more subtilty than solidity in it; I think, therefore,
that in our law, although the partnership regularly terminates by the
death of one of the partners, and his heir does not succeed him in
the future rights of the partnership, nevertheless, a stipulation that
he shall succeed, is binding.
This is the opinion of the old practitioner Masuer, "On Partner-
ships," 28. n. 33. The Roman jurisconsults themselves admitted
this agreement in partnerships for farming the public revenues.
Why not admit it equally in ordinary partnerships? Despeisses is
of the contrary opinion.
The second effect of the dissolution of community by the death
of one of the partners is, that it dissolves it even between the sur-
viving partners,' unless by the contract of partnership, it has been
agreed to the contrary: Norte unius socii societas dissolvitur, etsi
consensu omniurn coita sit, plures vera supersint5 nisi in ce'eunda
societate aliter convenerit; 1. 65. § 9. ff. Diet. Tit. Dig. lib. xvii.
tit. 2. 1. 65. § 9.
The reason is, that the personal qualities of each of the partners
are taken into consideration in the contract of partnership. I
ought not then to be obliged, when one of my partners is dead, to
remain in partnership with the others, because it may happen, that
it was only irL consideration of the personal qualities of the one
who is dead, that I was willing to enter into it.
This principle admits of an exception with regard to partnerships
for the farming of the public revenues which continue to subsist
IOur law is the same. Crawshay v. Maule, 1 Swanst. 495, 509; Gillespie v-
Hamilton, 3 Madd. 254; Vulliamy v. Noble, 3 Mer. 614; Coll. Partn. 72, 73; Story
Partn., 317, 318, 319, 319a, 4th ed. Burwell v. MIanderville, 2 How. S. C.
Rep. 560, and cases there cited. Pitkin v. Pltkin, 9 Conn. 307.
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between the survivors when one of the partners happens to die:
Mle ita in privatis societatibus ait. In societate vectigalium manet
societas et post mortem alicujus ; 1. 59. Dig. lib. xvii. tit. 2. 1. 59.
All that has been said of the case of the natural death of one
of the partners, applies to the case of his civil death.' JDissocia-
mur renunciatione, morte, capitis diminutione; 1. 4. § 1. ff. -Diet.
Tit. Dig. lib. xvii. tit. 2. 1. 4. § 1.
The insolvency of one of the partners also dissolves the partner-
ship, in the same manner as his death.2  Dissociamur egestate;
I According to our law a dissolution takes place when a person has lost his capa-
city to act suijuris, in consequence of his being outlawed or convicted and attainted
of felony or treason; and moreover the Crown thereupon becomes entitled, not
merely to the share of the offending, but also of the innocent partner; for by an
absurd doctrine, still existing, though practically obsolete, it is held that, as it is
beneath the dignity of the Crown to become a tenant in common or joint tenant
with a subject, it is therefore entitled to the whole by virtue of its prerogative.
See Watson Partn. 377, 378; Story Part.. 304. Colly. on Part, b. 1. c. 2., 2.;
Gow on Partn. ch. v. . 1. p. 216, 3d ed.
It may be here mentioned that, according to our law, the marriage of a female
partner will of itself operate as a dissolution of the partnership, because, in the
absence of any contract reserving the wife's personal property to her separate use,
it will belong to her husband absolutely; and, moreover, upon her marriage, except
as regards property settled to her separate use, she becomes incapable of binding
herself by any contracts. Nerot v. Burnard, 4 Russ. 24:7, 260. Gow on Partn.
ch. v., 1; Gow's Supp. p. 64, ed. 1841: 2 Bell's Comm. b. vii. ch. 2, p. 684,
5th ed.
2 So, according to our law, the insolvency or bankruptcy of one or more of the
partners will of necessity operate as a dissolution of the partnership, for as the
property of a bankrupt passes to his assignees he becomes unable to fulfill the
partnership contract, and with regard to the assignees the solvent partners are not
obliged to admit them into, and their duties will not allow them to carry on t~e
partnership. Fox v. Hanbury, Cowp. 445; Ex parte Smith, 5 Yes. 295 ; Wilson v.
Greenwood, 1 Swanst. 471, 482, 483; Crawshay v. Collins, 15 Ves. 217, 223. Story
on Partn. 314, 4th ed., and cases there cited, 3 Kent Com. 59, 9th ed. Mar-
quan . v. Manu. Comp., 17 Johns. 525; Mumford v. McKay, 8 Wend. 442; King-
man v. Spurr, 7 Pick. 235. And in the event of bankruptcy the dissolution which
takes effect immediately upon the adjudication of the bankruptcy will have relation
back to the act of bankruptcy. Barker v. Goodair, 11 Yes. 78, 83; Dutton V. Mor-
rison, 17 Yes. 194, 203. Waring v. Robinson, 1 Hoff. Ch. R. 524. Egberts v.
Wood, 3 Paige, 521.
.Diet. Tit. § 1. Bonis a' creditoribus venditis unius soeii, distrahi
sociatem Labeo ait; 1. 65. § 1. ff. Diet. Tit. According to our
law, it suffices that the insolvency be (ouverte) apparent.'
§ IV. As to the Wish to be no longer a Partner.
It is clear that the partnership can be dissolved by the mutual
consent of all the partners.
Can one of them dissolve it by his sole will, on giving notice to
his partners that he does not for the future intend to be in partner-
ship ? It is necessary, -with respect to this, to distinguish between
partnerships which have been contracted without any limitation of
time, and those which have been contracted for a certain limited
time.
With regard to the first, any one of the parties can dissolve the
partnership by giving notice to his partners that he no longer
intends to remain in the partnership. Dissociamur renunciatione;
1. 4. § 1.if. Pro Soc. Dig. lib. xvii. tit. 2. 1. 4. § 1.
For this effect, it is necessary that two things should occur; 1st,
that the renunciation of the partnership should be made in good
faith; 2ndly, that it should not be made at an unseasonable time.
Debet essefacta bond fide, et tempestivi. "
The renunciation is not made in good faith, when the partner
renounces in order to appropriate to himself alone the profit the
I A general assignment of all interest in the partnership property by one or more
of the partners will, it seems, operate as a dissolution of the partnership: the per-
son to whom the assignment is made, by that act, as we have seen, mer~ely has a
community of property with, but does not become a partner of, the other partners.
If they do not consent to admit him to the partnership, he cannot compel them to
do so; if they consent, then a new partnership is formed. See Story on Partn.
§ 272, 307. Horton's Appeal, 1 Harris, 67. Mason v. Connell, 1 Whart. 381.
Cochran v. Perry, 8 Watts & Seg. 262.
An assignment by a partner to his copartner of all his interest in the concern
from which the profits of the business (if any) are to arise, operates as a dissolu-
tion of the partnership, because the former thereby ceases to have a right to parti-
cipate in the profits; and since a partnership, as between parties, results from the
agreement to share in the profits, it ceases as soon as such right is determined.
Per Lord Denman, in Heath v. Sansom, 4 Barn. & Ad. 175.
PARTNERSHIP. .187
PARTNERSHIP.
partners had proposed to make when they entered into the partner-
ship.
For example, if two booksellers enter into partnership to buy
together a library, from which there was a profit to be made, and
before it has been bought on the partnership account, one of the
partners, in order to buy it on his own private account, and alone
to obtain the profits therefrom, gives notice to the other that he
does not intend any longer to be in partnership with him; that
renunciation of the partnership is made in bad faith, and does not
discharge him who has made it from his obligation towards his partner,
who can demand his share of the profits.
But, if that partner has renounced the partnership only because
he had a dislike to the speculation to carry out which they had
become partners, his renunciation is made in good faith, and is
valid, the business being yet untouched. In this case the other
partner can claim no damages against him.
This is what Paulus lays down :-Si societatem ineamus ad ali-
quam rem ernendam, deinde solus volueris earn emere, ideoque
renztnciaveris s9cietati, ut solus emeres ; teneberis, quanti interest
mea : sed si ideo renunciaveris quia emptio tibi displicebat, non
teneberis, quamvis ego emero, quia hie nullafraus est; 1. 65. § 4.
Dig. lib. xvii. tit. 2. 1. 65. § 4.
iPaulus gives another example :-During the continuance of a
universal partnership, which I have contracted with you, one of my
friends, being on his deathbed, gives me notice that he has insti-
tuted me his heir. I go quickly to give you notice that I intend
no longer to be in partnership with you. That renunciation being
made with the view of appropriating to myself the succession of my
friend, which ought to have fallen into our partnership, is void, as
being made in bad faith, and will not prevent that succession, if it
be beneficial, from falling into the partnership. Diet. 1. 65. 93.
In like manner, if two neighboring seigniors had contracted a
partnership together to receive in common the revenues of their
seigniories, and one of them having intelligence that a very con-
siderable estate, held in fief of his seigniory, was upon the point of
being sold, signifies to his partner his renunciation of the partner-
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ship, in order to appropriate to himself the gross profit of the fifth
to which that sale would give a right, that renunciation is made in
bad faith, and it ought to be declared void, and that the partner-
ship has continued, and profit accrued to it.
For the renunciation, which one of the partners has made of the
partnership, to be valid, it is necessary in the second place, that it
should not be made at an unseasonable time; that is to say, at a
time when things no longer remain in statu quo, and when it is the
interest of the partnership to wait for a more favorable time to com-
plete the business constituting the object of the partnership ; as if,.
having contracted a commercial partnership with you, I should wish
to dissolve the partnership at a time when it is the interest of the
partnership to reserve the stock in trade which we have bought in
common, and to wait for a more favorable time of sale. Si emimus
mancipia initd societate, deinde renunties mihi eo tempore, quo yen-
dere mancipia non expedit, hoc casu, quia deteriorem causan meam
facis, teneri te pro socio judicio. Die. 1. 65. § 5. Dig. lib. xvii.
tit. 2. 1. 65. § 5. Labeco.
Observe that, in order to judge whether a renunciation is made
at an unseasonable time,' it is necessary to consider the common
I According to our law it is clear that, although a partnership may have been
entered into for a limited period, it may be dissolved by the consent of all, but not
it seems, by the mere will of one of the parties. Peacock v. Peacock, 16 Ves. 56.;
Pearpont v. Graham, 4 Wash. 234; Bishop v. Breckles, 1 Hoff. Ch. Rep. 584;
Terry v. Carter, 25 Miss. 168; Story on Partn. 169, 173; Crawshay v. Maule,
1 Swanst. 495. Where, however, no time has been fixed for its duration, it is con-
sidered to be a mere partnership at will, and may consequently be dissolved upon
one or more of the partners giving notice to the others, without reference to the
distinction of the notice being seasonable or unseasonable. Master v. Kirton,
3 Ves. 74. ; Miles v. Thomas, 9 Sim. 606, 609. ; Nerot v. Burnard, 4 Russ. 247. 260.
-I have always," observed Lord Eldon, "taken the rule to be that in case of a
partnership not existing as to its duration by a contract between the parties, either
party has the power of determining it when he may think proper, subject to a
qualification I shall mention. There is, it is true, inconvenience in this; but what
would be more convenient ? In the case of a partnership expiring by effluxion
of time, the parties may, by previous arrangement, provide against the conse-
quences; but where the partnership is to endure so long as both partners shall
live, all the inconvenience from a sudden determination occurs in that instance
as much as in the other case." Peacock v. Peacock, 15 Ves. 56. But Mr. Swanston,
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interest of the partnership, and not the private interest of him who
opposes that renunciation, unless there be some agreement in the
contract of partnership, which is opposed to the renunciation. Hoe
ita vermn esse, si societatis intersit non dirimi soeietatem: semper
enirn non id, quod *rivatim interest unius ex sociis, servari solet,
sed quod societati expedit ; Hcec itd, accipienda sunt, si nihil de
hoc in co 'anda societate convenit. Dig. lib. xvii. tit. 2. 1. 65. § 5.
Proculus.
We now pass to partnerships which are contracted for a certain
limited time. In these partnerships the partners, by agreeing upon
the time for which the partnership is to continue, are considered to
agree not to dissolve it until after the expiration of that time, unless
there happen some just cause for dissolving it sooner. Therefore one
of them cannot, without just cause, dissolve the partnership before
the time, to the prejudice of his partners:' Qui societatem in tern-
in his note to Crawshay v. Maule, I Swanst. 512., has observed that in one
instance the Court of Chancery seems to have assumed jarisdiction to qualify the
right of renunciation. See Chavany v. Van Sommer, 3 Woodd. Lect. 416, note.
3 Kent Comm. 54, 62, 9th ed.
I According to our law a partnership for a limited time may, upon sufficient cause
being shown, be dissolved by the decree of a court of equity, although it may
not be dissolvable either by mere operation of law, or by the parties them-
selves. Gratz v. Bayard, 11 Serg. & Rawle 48; 3 Kent Comm. 60, 69, 9Eh ed. In
the first place, it may bo dissolved from its commencement, when it originated in
fraud, or misrepresentation, or oppression. Colt v. Wollaston, 2 P. Wins. 154. ;
Green v. Barrett, I Sim. 45. Another ground upon which the court will dissolve
a partnership, in its origin unobjectionable, is the gross misconduct of one of the
partners, amounting to a want of good faith, 'which is necessary to carry on the
partnerthip concern, Chapman v. Beach, 1 J. & W. 594.; as, for instance, when a
a partner raises money for his private use on the credit of the partnership firm,
Marshall v. Coleman, 2 J. & W. 266. ; or his conduct amounts to an entire ex-
clusion of his partner from his interest in the partnership, Goodman v. Whitcomb,
1 J. & W. 593. : or if he receives moneys and does not enter the receipts in the
books, or if he does not leave them open to the inspection of his partners (Ib.) ; or
if, contrary to the opinion and wish of the partners, he allows a person to draw
bills upon the partnership, and directs them to be paid out of the joint effects of
the partnership, Master v. Kirton, 3 Ves. 74. So when the conduct of one of the
partners is such as to prevent the concern from being carried on according
to the contract, Waters v. Taylor, 2 V. & B. 304. ; and it is stated in 7 Jarman's
Conveyancing, p. 83., upon'the authority of a MS. case, De Berenger v. Hamel,
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pus coit, earn anti tempus renuntiando, 8ocium d se, non se d socio
liberat; 1. 65. § 6. Dig. lib. xvii. tit. 2, 1. 65. § 6.
But if the partner has a just cause for quitting the partnership
cor. Sir L. Shadwell, V. C., 13 Nov. 1829, that violent and lasting dissension, as
when the parties refuse to meet each other upon matters of business-a state of
things which precludes the possibility of the partnership from being conducted with
advantage-will be a sufficient ground for a court of equity to decree a dissolu-
tion. But the court will not decree a dissolution for slight misconduct, especially
if there has been acquiescence, on the ground of mere ill temper on the part of one
of the partners. "Where parties differ," says Lord Eldon, "as they sometimes
do when they enter into a different kind of partnership, they should recollect that
they enter into it for better and worse, and this court has no jurisdiction to make
a separation between them because one is more sullen or less good-tempered than
the other. Another court, in the partnership to which I have alluded, cannot, nor
can this court, in this kind of partnership, interfere, unless there is a cause of
separation, which in the one case must amount to downright cruelty, and in the
other must be conduct amounting to an entire exclusion of the other partner from
his interest in the partnership. Goodman v. Witcomb, 1 J. & W. 592.; and see
Wray v. Hutchinson, 2 My. & K. 235. Story on Partn. 225, 229, 4th ed.
Moreover, the court will dissolve a partnership in some cases where nopersonal
blame attaches upon any of the partners, as, for instance, where it has become im-
possible to carry it on according to the intent and meaning of the contract,
Baring v. Dix, 1 Cox, 213. Thus where the partnership was originally entered
into for spinning cotton under a patent, which totally failed, and was entirely given
up, Lord Kenyon decided, that if, on a reference to the master, it was reported
that the partnership could not be carried on, he would direct the premises to be
sold, and would dissolve the partnership. And see Pearce v. Piper, 17 Ves. 1. ;
Buckley v. Cater, cited 17 Yes. 11, 15, 16; Reeve v. Parkins, 2 J. & W. 390.
Another ground upon which the court will dissolve a partnership, is the incura-
ble, and not merely temporary insanity of one of the partners, Sayer v. Bennett,
1 Cox, 107; Kirby v. Carr, 3 Y. & C. Excheq. Ca. 184; Wrexham v. Huddlestone,
1 Swanst. 504. n. Jones v. Noy, 2 My. & K. 125., of which proof of a person
having been found a lunatic, under a commission, will be conclusive evidence,
Milne v. Bartlett, 3 Jur. 858; 3 Kent Com. 58, 66, 9th ed. ; Story on Partn. 295,
296, 297, 297a; but in the absence of a stipulation for a dissolution in such an
event at a particular time, Bagshaw v. Parker, 10 Bear. 532., the dissolution will
only take place from the time of the decree. Besch v. Frolich, 1 Ph. 172.
A partnership may be dissolved by the award of arbitrators, provided their
powers are sufficient, for two reasons, either because it is the forum which the par-
ties have themselves chosen, and by whose decision they must consequently be
bound, or because such dissolution may be considered to have been made with the
consent of the parties. Heath v. Sansum, 4 Barn. & Ad. 172; Street v. Rigby,
6 Ves. 815. ; Story Partn. 215, 299, 300, 301, 4th ed.
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before the time, his renunciation of which he gives notice to his
partners, is valid, and dissolves the partnership, even when there is
an express clause in the contract of partnership that the partners
shall not be able to withdraw themselves from the partnership be-
fore the time. Pomponius therefore observes, that such a clause
is superfluous, because, even if it had not been expressed, one of
the partners could not before the time withdraw himself from the
partnership without a just cause, and if he has a just cause, that
clause cannot prevent his withdrawal: Quid tamen si hoc convenerit
"C ne abeatur," an valeat ? Blegantir Pomponus scripsit; frustra
hoc convenire; narn etsi non convenerit, si tamen intempestiv
renuntietur societati, esse pro socio actionem. Sed etsi convenerit
"ne intra certum tempus societate abeatur," et anta tempus renun-
tietur, potest rationem habere renuntiatio; 1. 24. ff. Pro Soc. Dig.
lib. xvii. tit. 2. 1. 14. Ulpian gives many examples of the just
causes a party may have for renouncing before the time; for in-
stance, if his partner did not execute the conditions of the partner-
ship; if he has proof that his partner refuses to allow him to enjoy
in his turn the thing which they have put in partnership; if he has
proof of the bad conduct of his partner in the management of the
affairs of the partnership: Non teneitur pro socio, qui ideo renun-
tiavit, quia conditio qucedam, qud societas erat coita, ei non prCes-
tatur; aut quid, si ita injuriosus et damnosus socius sit, ut non
expediat eum pati; 1. 14. ff. -Dict. Tit. Dig. lib. xvii. tit. ii. 1. 14.
Moreover, a partner will have just cause for renouncing the part-
nership before the time, when, in consequence of his being obliged
to be absent during a long time on the service of the State, he can
no longer give his attention to the affairs of the partnership, unless,
indeed, the affairs of the partnership are such that there is no need
of his being present ; 1. 16. DZict. Tit.
The same may be said in case of an inveterate infirmity which
has seized upon one of the partners. It might be a just cause for
his renouncing the partnership, if the affairs of the partnership
were such as to require his personal attention.
In order that a renunciation of a partnership should operate as
a dissolution, the partner, when so renouncing should give notice to
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all the partners. This notification, in case it is not admitted by
the partners to whom it has been made, ought to be proved by
-writing, either by a notice served by a huissier' on them personally,
or at their domicile, or by a deed under private signature, by which
they acknowledge that such notice has been given to them. But
that deed not being evidence against third parties having an interest
in the continuance of the partnership, (see Pothier on Obligations,
n. 750), it is more prudent to give such notice by a huissier.
When the renunciation of the partnership is likely to be the sub-
ject of contest, it will be prudent for the party who has made it to
summon his partners before the court, in order to establish its
validity.
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For if, after his renunciation, the partners to whom it has been
made, incur losses, they can object to him the defects of his renun-
ciation, and if it is found to be made in bad faith, or unseasonably,
he will be compelled to bear his share of the losses; while, on the
contrary, if after the renunciation they have acquired profits, the
partner who has made it cannot claim a share, it not being allow-
able for him to insist on the nullity of his own renunciation, and to
oppose to it its defects. Hence the jurisconsults say, that the
partner who renounces with bad faith, or unseasonably disengages
his partner from himself, and does not disengage himself from his
partner, Anti tempus renuntiando, socium d so, non so d socio
liberat; 1. 65, § 6. Dig. lib. xvii. tit. 2. 1. 65, § 6.
1 A sort of under sheriff, or summoner.
2
It will be observed, that in the case of partnerships for a limited time, there
exists a difference ir the mode in which a dissolution of a partnership may be
effected under the French law and our own. According to the former the partner
may, by his own act, primarily insist upon a dissolution, which, however, is not
valid, unless it be for a just cause, and is affirmed to be so by a court of justice;
whereas our law does not allow the dissolution to be complete or effective until a
court of justice has itself decreed the dissolution for a just cause. In substance,
therefore, the rule is the same in both cases, although it is varied in its actual ap-
plication. The rule of our law is quite as convenient as that of the French law,
if, indeed, it be not more appropriate, just and equitable. Story Partn. 298.
